Criminal Conspiracy (John Gotti Trial)

According to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2007), a charge of criminal conspiracy is valid if a person plots or agrees with another person to commit an act, which if actually carried out, is a criminal offense in and of itself. E.g.,The ‘Lectric Law Library, Conspiracy, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c103.htm (last visted September 1, 2010). The crime of conspiracy is difficult to pin down simply because it is usually a verbal agreement between two or more people. That boils down to a “he said, she said” argument based on who is more credible. If an act has been committed in which two people were involved, we can pretty easily assume they conspired to commit the crime. John Gotti Jr. was accused of conspiracy to commit murder in the killings of George Grosso, Louis DiBono and Bruce John Gotterup. E.g., Christine Armario & Tom Hayes, An Indictment Links Gotti To 3 Killings in New York, New York Sun, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/gotti-arrested-on-murder-conspiracy/83225/ (last visited September 1, 2010). In the case of John Gotti Jr.’s involvement in the deaths of the three individuals he was accused of conspiring to have murdered, the only evidence we have is the word of a former associate. Provided the facts in the case are as described, that Gotti did indeed order hits on the three men, then he would indeed be guilty of conspiracy and subject to indictment under the law. Law enforcement had linked Gotti to several criminal enterprises and pegged him as a chief operator in the Gambino crime family. Id.
          The question here is not whether Gotti committed the murders but did he conspire to have the murders committed. The courts had initially determined that a conspiracy conviction requires “proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy" See Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687 (2005) (No. 03-1293), but after further review in United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), determined that evidence of an overt act is not required. That validated, in my opinion, a conspiracy charge against Gotti, but from the information provided, we can’t really tell what level of involvement he had in the crimes. So that takes the the burden of proof falling essentially on one man’s word against Gotti’s. The jury in that case felt there was not enough evidence to convict him, the court declared a mistrial and he was released from prison. E.g. Prosecution's case against Junior Gotti wasn't credible, juror says, Kenny Porpora & Larry McShane, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/ 2009/12/02/2009-12-02_their_case_wasnt_credible_juror_says.html#ixzz0yPGDbGbR (last visited September 2, 2010).
          It seems to me that conspiracy by itself is an awfully difficult thing to prove in the courtroom. Unless there is physical evidence linking someone to a crime or to a plot to commit a crime, it boils down to a battle of individual credibility. In this situation, when you have a figure who is very well known, who has been linked to a major criminal operation, and who has repeatedly faced charges (that have never stuck), a soft charge like conspiracy is grasping at straws. Someone who can afford the best legal counsel money can buy probably isn’t going to be convicted by the testimony of a single witness who is only testifying to cut his own deal.

Case Brief: State v. Stark

Case: State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash.App. 1992)

Facts:

• Defendant Stark tested positive for HIV, which was confirmed by two follow-up tests; defendant received five counseling sessions on “safe sex”, the risk of spreading the infection, and the necessity of informing his partners of his status before engaging in sexual activity.
• The county health officer learned that the defendant had disregarded the advice and counseling and issued a cease a desist order as authorized by state statute.
• Defendant did not head the cease and desist order; the health officer then requested judicial enforcement of the order and was advised to file a police report.
• Testimony was obtained from the three victims confirming sexual acts took place after the defendant was made aware of and counseled about his HIV-positive status, as well as the defendant’s neighbor who testified that the defendant had stated “I don’t care. If I’m going to die, everybody’s going to die.”

Procedural Posture: 

• Defendant Stark was charged with second degree assault on three counts; he had tested positive for HIV and although he received counseling on safe sex practices on several occasions, he continued to engage in sexual activity with three women, exposing them to the HIV virus. 
• Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of second degree assault and received on exceptional sentence of 120 months in prison. 
• Defendant was convicted on two counts of second degree assault in a bench trial and sentenced of two 43 month sentences, to be served concurrently, and consecutively to the first sentence. 
• Defendant sought review of the court judgment that imposed a sentenced that exceeded the standard range for second degree assault.

Issue:

• Did the state violate confidentially by making the defendant's HIV-positive status public in a criminal trial?
• Was the evidence submitted by the prosecution sufficient to show the defendant's intent to inflict bodily harm?
• Is the statute used to convict the defendant unconstitutionally vague?
• Was the trial court remiss in imposing an exceptional sentence on first charge?

Holding decision:

The court affirmed the convictions on all three counts, but remanded the case back to the trial court for re-sentencing on the first count.

Reasoning:

• The court found that in the county health officer did not violate the defendant’s confidentiality by discussing Stark’s IV-positive status with the prosecutor. RCW 70.24.034(1) and RCW 70.24.034(2) allow the heath official to use court action to detain a person dangerous to the public health and specifically mentions involving the prosecuting attorney. 
•  The court found that there was sufficient evidence through victim testimony, the county health officer's testimony, and witness testimony,that the defendant knowingly and intentionally exposed his victims to HIV. 
• The court found that the statute used to convict the defendant is not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague just because a person cannot know exactly the moment his actions become prohibited. 
• The court found that the trial court was not justified in imposing an exceptional sentence; it cannot use a threat of potential future dangerousness to hand out a sentence significantly longer than the standard sentence. This charge was remanded for re-sentencing.

Juvenile Justice Systems in Finland and China

Finland in general operates under a different type of socioeconomic system than what we see in the United States. The basic tenets of the welfare model include “universalism, equality and public responsibility.” Finland aims to avoid any type of structured material inequality by maintaining a high level of income redistribution through taxation and decommoditization of goods (Harrikari, 2008, p. 30). That said, a stronger emphasis on less punitive treatment of juvenile delinquents fits in with the Finnish model of helping rather than punishing. Indeed juveniles who commit crimes receive less harsh treatment than adults, which cannot be said for all types of juvenile offenses in the United States. Finnish youthful offenders receive lighter sentences, and more significantly, unlike the U.S., sentences have not become more severe over the last fifteen years (Harrikari, p. 34). Compared with the early 1990s, the number of offences handled by juvenile courts has decreased, meaning fewer crimes are remanded to court proceedings. A greater sense of child welfare in Finland could be adopted here, which I truly believe would help the quality of the juvenile justice system. The method of looking at child offenders as pure cases of rehabilitation or aid rather than as criminal punishment would shift the focus of the program.
          China takes a participatory model of juvenile justice, where the intervention of the courts is rarely used. Citizens and special agencies work to curb juvenile delinquency and only in the most extreme cases will the legal system become involved. In 1991, China adopted new legislation which defines how parents and legal guardians are responsible for the welfare, education and other legal rights of a juvenile. The Juvenile Protection Law of 1991 sets out the standard of criminal juvenile law, which states that education is the primary means of handling delinquency and punishment is the secondary means of handling juveniles who commit crimes (Wong, 2004, p. 54). I think this is an excellent model for the U.S. to incorporate; it puts the onus back on the parents to keep their kids in line and doesn’t resort to bogging down the legal system with petty childhood crime. Fixing or correcting the problem before it is broken, rather than sending away our “hopeless cases” of juvenile offenders, lessens the impact of adult crime and gives young people the chance to turn it around before it gets worse.

Harrikari, T. (2008). Exploring Risk Governance in the Nordic Context: Finnish Juvenile Crime and
          Child Welfare. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 20(1), 29-42.
Wong, D. W. (2004). Juvenile Protection and Delinquency Prevention Policies in China.
          Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 3752-66.